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COMMON LAW CLAIMS CHALLENGING
ADEQUACY OF CIGARETTE WARNINGS
PREEMPTED UNDER THE FEDERAL
CIGARETTE LABELING AND
ADVERTISING ACT OF 1965: CIPOLLONE
v. LIGGFTT GROUP, INC.
In 1965, Congress enacted the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act ("Act")', which requires that manufacturers place
a warning on cigarette packages informing the public that cigarette
smoking may be hazardous to health.2 The Act expressly preempts
15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
See id. at 15 U.S.C. § 1333. The original Act of 1965 required that a warning be
conspicuously placed on cigarette packages: "CAUTION: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous To Your Health." See id. This warning was changed in 1969 to read: "WARNING:
The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous To Your
Health." See 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (as amended). Finally, after repeated requests from the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") Congress again amended its warning so as to make it more
effective. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (a)-(d) (1982 & Supp. 1986). This amendment, based upon a
successful Swedish system, see H.R. REP. No. 805, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprintedin 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 3725, provides that every cigarette package, advertisement
and billboard must have one of the following four warnings:
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces
Serious Risks To Your Health.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women May Result
In Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth Weight.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon
Monoxide.
15 U.S.C. § 1333(c) (1982 & Supp. 1986). The statute requires the quarterly alternation of
warnings. See id.
Congress included an express statement of its policy under the Act in section 1331,
which provides that:
1) [T]he public may be adequately informed about any adverse health effects of
cigarette smoking by inclusion of warning notices on each package of cigarettes
and in each advertisement of cigarettes; an
2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the maximum
extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not impeded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with respect
to any relationship between smoking and health.
15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982 & Supp. 1986). The Act also provides that the FTC will annually
report to Congress concerning the effectiveness of the warnings and will make recommendations where appropriate. See 15 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982). The district courts of the United
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the states from imposing "requirements or prohibitions" with respect to the advertising or labeling of cigarette packages when they
have been labeled in conformity with the provisions of the Act.3
Although federal law supersedes conflicting state law under the
preemption doctrine,4 it has remained unclear whether section
States are empowered to enjoin violations of the Act's provisions, see id. at § 1339, and
violators are subject to a fine of not more than $10,000. See id. at § 1338.
3 See 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982). The section provides:
a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required by section 1333 of this title, shall be required on any cigarette package.
b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed
under state law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the
packages of which are labelled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.
Id.
Preemption may be found in the express language of the federal statute or may be
implicitly contained in its structure. See Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). It is well recognized that state common law may be preempted if
Congress' intent to do so is clear. See Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 403 (1963). The
United States Supreme Court has identified several methods for determining whether Congress intended to preempt state law. Id. First, Congress can expressly provide for the exclusivity of the federal statute or regulation by an explicit statement barring state law on the
subject. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). Since the scope of the
preemption clause may be difficult to ascertain even with an express statement, it has been
asserted that "even unambiguous statements of statutory intent require analysis." See
Rothschild, A Proposed "Tonic" with FloridaLime to Celebrate Our New Federalism:How
to Deal with the "Headache" of Preemption, 38 U. MiAnii L. REv. 829, 844 (1983); see also
L. TRmE, AMRICAN CONSTITuTIONAL LAW 377 (1978) (preemption is function of statutory
analysis and construction). Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that mere expressions of
the "comprehensive nature" of a federal regulatory scheme does not permit the inference
that Congress intended to preempt state law. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712-13 (1985); accord De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,
359-66 (1976)(Congress' creation of comprehensive scheme does not bar states from identifying additional needs or imposing further requirements.).
Secondly, a court may imply congressional intent to preempt state law. See Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984). The Supreme Court has observed that in a
given area, "[t]he scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it." Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). Finally, where a federal statute or regulation has
not entirely precluded the operation of state law, state law may be preempted to the "extent
that it actually conflicts with federal law." See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation & Dev.Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983). A state law will actually
conflict with federal law when "'compliance with both federal and state regulations is a
physical impossibility.. . .' " Id. at 204 (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)). Actual conflict will also be found when the state law
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67-68 (1941).
' See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The preemption doctrine is based upon the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution, which provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Author-
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1334 of the Act precludes a state common law tort claim challenging the sufficiency of cigarette warning-labels. 5 Recently, in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.," the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that a state tort claim challenging the sufficiency of
cigarette warning labels creates an impermissible obstacle to the
full purposes of Congress, and thus is preempted by section 1334 of
the Act.7
ity of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
Chief Justice Marshall first recognized this doctrine in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 202 (1824). Noting that "the Constitution is the supreme law," Marshall wrote, "the
act of Congress, or the treaty is supreme; and the law of the state, though enacted in the
exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it." Id. at 211; see also Fidelity Fed. Say.
and Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982) (Supremacy Clause is foundation of preemption doctrine).
Preemption is defined as the "[d]octrine adopted by [the] U.S. Supreme Court holding
that certain matters are of such a national, as opposed to local, character that federal laws
pre-empt or take precedence over state laws." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1060 (5th ed. 1979).
The framers of the Constitution, aware that legal conflicts would surface in a federal system,
made provision for their swift resolution in the Supremacy Clause. See generally THE FEDREALIST No. 44 323 (J. Madison)(B. Wright ed. 1961)(without Supremacy Clause, government would be "a monster, in which the head was under the direction of the members.").
The framers, however, recognized that the Supremacy Clause could not be used to preempt
every hypothetical conflict between the federal government and the states. See THE FEDERALIST No. 32 243 (A. Hamilton)(B. Wright ed. 1961); see also Goldstein v. California, 412
U.S. 546, 554-55 (1973) (must distinguish situations where concurrent exercise of federal
and state power possibly leads to conflicts from situations where conflicts will "necessarily"
arise).
5 See generally Garner, CigaretteDependency And Civil Liability: A Modest Proposal,
53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1423, 1453-54 (1980) (although no litigation has clarified preemptive extent
of section 1334, author proposes that common law claims are not preempted by section
1334). Common law claims challenging the adequacy of advertising and labeling practices
had been brought against cigarette manufacturers prior to the passage of the 1965 Act. See,
e.g., Green v. American Tobacco Co., 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc) (implied warranty of fitness for use under Florida law not extended to lung cancer victim where cigarettes not found to be "defective") cert.denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970); Pritchard v. Liggett &
Myers Tobacco Co., 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966) (reversing jury verdict for defendants in
common law claim for negligent failure to warn and breach of warranty of fitness under
Pennsylvania law), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1009 (1967); see also Comment, Products Liability-Can It Kick The Smoking Habit?, 19 AKRON L. REV. 269 (1985) (discussion of plaintiff's claims challenging cigarette manufacturers in products liability suits). One commentator has marvelled at the civil immunity enjoyed by the tobacco industry, noting that
"lawyers for the tobacco industry do not settle out of court." See Garner, supra, at 1425-26.
- 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3474 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1987)(No.
86-563).
' See id. at 187. Two district courts have recently considered whether common law
liability is preempted under the Act. Compare Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623
F. Supp. 1189, 1191 (E.D. Tenn. 1985)(common law claims preempted under section 1334)
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In Cipollone, the plaintiff filed a state tort claim in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging that
she developed lung cancer after forty years of smoking cigarettes
manufactured by the defendant-companies. 8 The fourteen-count
complaint averred, inter alia, that the defendants' warnings, with
respect to the health and safety of cigarette smoking, were inadequate to fully warn the plaintiff of the hazards of smoking. e The
defendants asserted that plaintiff's claims challenging the sufficiency of the warnings were preempted by section 1334 of the
Act.10 The plaintiff moved to strike the defendants' preemption
defenses, while the defendants Lorillard and Phillip Morris moved
for judgment on the pleadings. 1 Writing for the district court,
Judge Sarokin held that section 1334 of the Act did not preempt
the plaintiff's common law rights to seek damages based upon the
2
inadequacy of the defendants' labeling practices.'
with Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986) (defendant's motion
to dismiss on grounds that plaintiff's claim is preempted under section 1334 denied).
8 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd, 789 F.2d
181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3474 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1987)(No. 86-563). Plaintiff
Rose Cipollone died of lung cancer in October, 1984, shortly after the decision of the district
court. See Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 183. Her husband, who had joined in the claim alleging
loss of consortium, continued the action on appeal to the Third Circuit individually and asexecutor of Mrs. Cipollone's estate. Id. at 183-84. Joined as defendants with the Liggett
Group, Inc. were Philip Morris, Inc., Loew's Corporation and Loew's Theater Inc. (Lorillard). Id.
See Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1149. Plaintiffs included three separate claims in their
complaint based on strict liability, alleging that the cigarettes were unsafe, defective, and
did not carry adequate warnings of smoking hazards. Id. Plaintiffs also alleged that the
defendants negligently failed to warn of the hazards of smoking and negligently advertised
in such a way as to "neutralize" the existing warnings. Id. Plaintiffs additionally claimed
that defendants intentionally deprived the public of scientific and medical reports which
reflected the inherent dangers of cigarette smoking (intentional tort) and intentionally failed
to adequately warn plaintiffs of those dangers. Id. Finally, plaintiffs asserted that defendants breached their implied warranty of fitness in selling a defective product. Id. Mr. Cipollone claimed loss of comfort, companionship and consortium of his wife. Id. at 1149 n.1.
10 See Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 183.
" See id.
12 See Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1170-71. Judge Sarokin granted plaintiff's motion to
strike the defenses and denied defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, reasoning
that the legislative history of the Act did not demonstrate a clear congressional intent to
preempt state tort claims. See id. at 1163. The Supreme Court has held that there is "[a]
basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law." Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981). Applying the recognized guidelines to ascertain congressional
intent to preempt state law, see supra note 3, Judge Sarokin found that there was no express language in the Act to preempt state common law. See Cipolone, 593 F. Supp. at
1155. In addition, the court reasoned that while Congress intended to "occupy the field" of
cigarette labeling and advertising, it did not intend to occupy the separate field of state tort
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On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed in part the ruling of the
district court. Is Writing for the court, Judge Hunter noted that although the federal scheme created by the Act was not "so dominant as to eradicate all of [the plaintiff's] state law claims," "14 section 1334 preempts those common law claims which challenge
either the adequacy of cigarette warning labels or the propriety of
the advertising or promotion of cigarettes. 5 Applying the same
preemption analysis as the district court," Judge Hunter determined that the Act represented a "carefully drawn balance between the purposes of warning the public of the hazards of cigarette smoking and protecting the interests of [the] national
economy.' 1 7 The court reasoned, however, that an award of damages could have the regulatory effect of imposing "requirements"
on cigarette manufacturers, 18 thereby "creating an obstacle" to the
remedies to compensate injured plaintiffs. See id. at 1164. Judge Sarokin ruled that compliance with the Act and allowing common law claims was neither "physically impossible," id.
at 1167, nor was it an "obstacle to congressional purposes." Id. at 1169.
In dicta, the district court noted that the Surgeon General's warning fixes the minimum
legal requirement for cigarette manufacturers, and that mere compliance with the minimum
standard will not immunize cigarette manufacturers from liability when congressional intent
to do so is not "crystal clear." See id. at 1156. In support of its reasoning, the court cited
Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1542 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062
(1984) wherein the District of Columbia Circuit held that compliance with an Environmental Protection Agency approved warning label under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act was a minimum requirement and would not preclude the operation of state
tort claims challenging the sufficiency of the warning. See Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1153;
see also Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 658 (1st Cir. 1981)(drug manufacturers liable under state tort law for failure to warn despite compliance with FDA approved "uniform" label).
" See Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 188.
14 Id. at 186.
See id. at 188. Judge Hunter agreed with the district court that Congress only intended to occupy the field of labeling, and not state common law. See id.at 186. He therefore concluded that plaintiffs could still sue under state common law, as long as those claims
did not challenge the sufficiency of defendants' labels. See id. at 188.
"eSee supra notes 3 and 12. The Third Circuit, however, did not determine whether
compliance with both the Act and state common law was a "physical impossibility." See
Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187.
17 Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187. In determining whether a state law is in "actual conflict"
with federal law, it is necessary to initially determine the purposes of the federal law and
effect of the state law on those purposes. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971);
Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 63 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc). Judge Hunter relied solely
upon the express statement of Congress regarding its policy under the Act. See Cipollone,
789 F.2d at 187; supra note 2. (express statement of policy underlying Act found in section
1331).
18 See Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187; see also San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)(statutory claim for compensation can have regulatory effect and
therefore may be preempted by federal act); Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 962
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full purposes of Congress.19 Judge Hunter declared that to expose
cigarette manufacturers to liability under state tort law for inadequate warning labels would tip the "balance of purposes" Congress
sought to preserve, and thus "actually conflict" with section 1334

of the Act.20
The Cipollone court held that an injured plaintiff alleging the
inadequacy of a cigarette manufacturer's warning label may not recover in tort when the manufacturer has complied with the provisions of the Act.21 It is submitted that the Third Circuit, in applying the principles of obstacle conflict to its preemption analysis,
failed to adhere to the congressional intent underlying the Act.
This Comment will examine the legislative history of the Act, and
will suggest that Congress intended that common law tort claims
would survive the passage of the Act. Furthermore, it will be asserted that the court's conflict analysis was based on inference and
speculation, and is therefore insufficient to warrant preemption of
state common law. Finally, this Comment will assert that the approach to conflict analysis typified by Hines v. Davidowitz22 be
abandoned, as it encourages the creation of hypothetical conflicts
between state and federal law based on discretionary determinations of congressional "purpose."
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CONGRESSIONAL PURPOSE

The legislative history of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act demonstrates that the Act and its amendments are
(3d Cir. 1980)(common law liability has "effect" of imposing requirement), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 959 (1981). It should be noted, however, that while the statute in Garmon created a
remedy for injured plaintiffs, see Garmon, 359 U.S. at 247, the Act in Cipollone does not
make provision for plaintiff's remedies. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
,9 Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
20 See Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187. The circuit court does not explain how a common law
claim "tips" the balance of purposes, but rather "accepts" defendant's assertion that it
would be an "obstacle." See id. The district court had noted, however, that the possibility of
common law liability simply allows manufacturers to choose whether or not they wish to
alter their labels, and is therefore not a "requirement" under section 1334 of the Act. See
Cipolone, 593 F. Supp. at 1156.
21 See Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187.
22 312 U.S. 52 (1941). Under the Hines analysis, the determination of whether a state
law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress" involves a two-pronged test Hines, 312 U.S. at 67-68. The court is
required to "examine first the purposes of the federal law and second the effect of the operation of the state law on these purposes." Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 63 (3d Cir.
1980)(en banc)(citing Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971)).
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intended to promote public safety by requiring that adequate
warnings of the hazards of cigarette smoking be placed on all cigarette packages and advertisements.2 3 In 1964, the Surgeon General's Advisory Committee Report concluded that the hazards of
cigarette smoking were of sufficient importance to necessitate remedial action on a federal level.2 4 Following this report, Congress
passed the Act in favor of public safety, despite debate which
threatened the passage of legislation regarding cigarettes. 25 Pursuant to Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") reports on the effectiveness of the warning provisions,2 6 Congress later amended the
See H.R. REP. No. 449, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2350. "The principle purpose of this Bill is to provide adequate warning to the
public of the potential hazards of cigarette smoking by requiring the labeling of cigarette
packages with the [warning]." Id.; see supra note 2 (evolution of language of warnings). The
1969 amendment expressly sought to provide "strengthened cautionary labeling" with respect to smoking and its hazardous effects. See S. REP. No. 566, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1,
reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2652. The express purpose of the 1984
amendment was to "increase public awareness of any adverse health effects of smoking."
H.R. REP. No. 805, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3718. Section 1331 of the Act also provides that it is the policy of Congress to protect
the national economy. See 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). In discussing the potential conflicts in
policy underlying the legislation, it was stated that:
One basic objective of each of these bills is the same - to protect the health of
consumers and prospective consumers of cigarettes. H.R. 3014 and H.R. 4007 have
the additional stated objective of protecting commerce and the national economy.
While we would ordinarily strongly support both objectives, we feel that ...the
proposed means of attaining the latter objective may be incompatible with the
health protection objective. Under such circumstances we believe that the public
health interest must prevail.
Letter from Robert Giles, General Counsel, Department of Commerce (April 7, 1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2361 (emphasis added).
2'4See H.R. REP. No. 449, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprintedin 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2351. The report, entitled Smoking And Health concluded, inter alia, that
"cigarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient importance in the United States to warrant appropriate remedial action." Id.
" See generally H.R. REP. No. 805, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3720 (summary of legislative history of 1965 Act and its amendments). The House debate centered primarily on the adequacy of protection for the public
in the warnings proposed by both the House and the Senate. See id. at 3721. However,
fearful that Congress would adjourn without having made provision for a cigarette warning
requirement, a compromise was reached because, in the words of one House member, "in
spite of the fact that this was not everything we wanted, it was better than not coming up
with some legislation in 1965." 111 CONG. REc. 16,543 (July 13, 1965) (comments of Rep.
Springer); see also id. (comments of Rep. Harris, expressing fear that it would be "years"
before warnings would be required if Congress did not act in 1965).
2 See H.R. Rm. No. 805, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3721. Pursuant to section 1337, see supra note 2, the 1967 FTC report stated
that "there is virtually no evidence that the warning statement on cigarette packages required by Congress has had any significant effect." H.R. REP. No. 805, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 9,
23
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Act to increase public awareness of the hazards of smoking through
strengthened cautionary labeling. 27 Finally, Congress sought to further the ultimate remedial purposes of the Act by passing the
Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984,28 which strengthened the amended warnings and mandated the dissemination of
29
research to the public concerning smoking and its adverse effects.

In reaching its decision, the Cipollone court relied solely upon the
express statement of Congress as to the policy underlying the
Act.30 It is submitted that the Cipollone court erred in dismissing
the legislative history of the Act, which points clearly to the remereprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG, & ADMIN. NEWS 3721. The 1968 FTC report expressed its
dissatisfaction with the adequacy of Congress' warning and further urged that Congress
should ban all broadcast advertising of cigarette smoking. See 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3722.
17 See Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, Pub. L. No. 91-222 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982)); supra note 2 (warning provision of 1969 amendment). In addition, the 1969 amendment banned the broadcast advertising of cigarettes in response to the
depiction of cigarette smoking as a "harmless," pleasurable activity. See 15 U.S.C. § 1335
(1982); H.R. REP. No. 805, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS. 3718, 3721.
Despite the increased public awareness of the hazards of cigarette smoking, subsequent
FTC reports concluded that the public needed more education as to the ill effects of smoking, and that such could only be remedied on a comprehensive federal scale. See id. at 3724.
FTC reports in 1977 and 1979 recommended that still stronger warnings be required on
cigarette packages, including statistics detailing tar and nicotine levels. See id. In 1981, the
FTC published a Staff Report on cigarette advertising, and concluded that "[a]dditional
action was needed" to supply the public with greater information regarding the hazards of
smoking. Id.
28 Pub. L. No. 98-474 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1982 & Supp.
1986)).
21 See supra note 2 (text of amended warning label). Section 1341(a)-(c) established an
Interagency Committee on Smoking and Health to collect, analyze and disseminate information regarding smoking and its adverse effects and to make recommendations to Congress
where necessary. See id. at § 1341.
30 See Cipollone, 789 F. 2d at 187; supra note 2 (text of congressional policy in section
1331). Express statements of congressional policy are often efforts at political conciliation,
and as such cannot be read in a vacuum. See Rothschild, supra note 3, at 844, 850. The
"politics" of the situation will often determine the "precision" of the legislative draft finally
enacted, thus even unambiguous statements of policy require analysis. See id. Any preemption analysis of the purpose behind an act should, therefore, take into consideration the
legislative history of the act. See Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1167 n.15. It is suggested that
the Cipollone court's interpretation of Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984), and Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), see Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 186, as supporting its
refusal to resort to legislative history in its preemption analysis is in error. While both cases
recognize that discretion must be used in any analysis of legislative history, the Supreme
Court makes extensive use of the legislative history in both cases to ascertain the congressional intent and purpose behind the federal laws involved. See Piper, 430 U.S. at 25;
Blum, 465 U.S. at 896; see also L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 377 (question of whether federal
law preempts state action is "largely one of statutory construction").
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dial purpose of increasing public safety through its warning provisions. The Third Circuit compounded this error by precluding the
possibility of common law tort liability, which would motivate
manufacturers to provide more effective warning-labels in further31
ance of the remedial purposes of the Act.
LEGISLATIVE RECOGNITION OF COMMON LAW CLAIMS

It is suggested that while the legislative history of the Act
reveals a congressional intent to preempt state legislative regulation of cigarette advertising, it does not require the abolition of
common law remedies for a plaintiff injured by inadequate warnings. Congressional hearings on the regulation of the cigarette industry have made frequent reference to the adverse effects of conflicting state statutes, but have been silent as to the preemption of
common law claims.3 2 Common law claims challenging the sufficiency of a manufacturer's warning provisions existed prior to the
Act, and congressional debates indicate that such claims were to
remain viable." In addition, while Congress made express provi31

See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541-42 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,

469 U.S. 1062 (1984). "[T]he specter of damage actions may provide manufacturers with
added dynamic incentives to continue to keep abreast of all possible injuries stemming from
use of their product so as to forestall such actions through product improvement." Id. See
also Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1169 (payment of compensation will aid in exposing unknown dangers of cigarette smoking).
32 See generally Hearings on H.R. 643 Before the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 13,901 (1969) (statement of Sen. Moss.) Congress
contemplated avoiding the "maze of conflicting regulations" which might have resulted if
remedial response to hazards of smoking were left to individual states. See id. The "maze"
that Congress sought to avoid, however, was the likelihood of states and municipalities
"passing different regulations requiring the manufacturers to have different labels." Id.
(statement of Rep. Fountain)(emphasis added). Joseph Cullman III, Chairman of the Tobacco Institute, expressed similar fears as to the great difficulty the industry would have
complying with different state legislative enactments. See id. It is submitted, however, that
the conspicuous absence of any reference to the preemption of state common law claims, see
15 U.S.C. § 1334(b), (1982), evidences Congress' intention to preclude only state and local
legislatures from passing conflicting labeling laws.
3' See supra note 9; see also Albright v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 350 F. Supp. 341,
344 (W.D. Pa. 1972)(products liability action challenging sufficiency of labeling practices
under Pennsylvania law), aff'd mem., 485 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1973) (per curiam), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 951 (1974). Albright was originally filed in 1962. See Garner, supra note 9, at 1423.
Frequent references to the defense of "assumption of risk" evidence Congress' recognition that plaintiffs' state-created right to common law remedies would be preserved under
the Act. See 111 CONG. REc. 16,543-44 (1965). It was stated that:
The legislative record makes it clear that passage of this law and compliance by
the manufacturer in no way effects the right to raise the defense of "assumption of
risk" and the legal requirement for such a defense to prevail; nor does it shift the
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sion for the criminal enforcement of the Act,34 the conspicuous absence of a civil remedy strengthens the presumption that Congress
did not intend to preempt traditional state tort law.35 Inasmuch as
the legislative history of the Act recognizes common law claims as
distinct from state regulation, the Third Circuit's expansive reading of section 1334 is unjustified.3
Recent legislation enacted by Congress in the field of uniform
tobacco warnings has expressed congressional intent that such
warnings co-exist with common law tort claims rather than preempt them.3 7 This legislation, the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986 ("Act of 1986"),38 requires
manufacturers of smokeless tobacco to inform the public of its adverse health effects by placing warning-labels on their products.3 9
burden of proof, nor could it be considered a legal or factual bar to the plaintiff
user.
Id. (statement of Rep. Fascell); see also Hearingson H.R. 643 Before the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 579 (1969) (statement of Rep.
Watson) ("Nowhere in the Act of 1965 does it preclude an individual from pursuing a common law liability [action], as far as I know."); CigaretteLabelling and Advertising: Hearings on H.R. 2248 Before the House Committee on Interstateand Foreign Commerce, 89th
Cong. 1st Sess. 176 (1965) (statement of Mr. Ellenbagen, Asst. General Counsel to the Dept.
of Health, Education and Welfare) ([C]ommon law remedies were "a private matter ... not
regulated by this bill").
34 See 15 U.S.C. § 1338 (1982). Violations of the Act are subject to a fine of not more
than $10,000. Id. The district courts are invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain
violations upon the application of the Attorney General, acting through the several U.S.
Attorneys in their districts. See id. at § 1339.
11 See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
38 The Supreme Court has held that when two distinct areas of the law are implicated,
preemption is improper. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 240-47
(1984) (the regulatory scheme of Price-Anderson Act does not preempt separate state common law claims); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 190 (1983) (the Atomic Energy Act does not preempt traditional
state powers to regulate utilities). It is asserted that Congress has recognized that common
law claims exist apart from state legislation in the field of cigarette labeling. See infra note
37. The presumption against preemption is thereby strengthened. See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at
246.
,. See Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-252, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 30 (1986). The Act of 1986 is
very similar to the cigarette labeling act in requiring rotational warnings on smokeless tobacco products and advertisements, and seeking to achieve national uniformity in labeling
requirements. See id.; Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171, 1179 (D. Mass.
1986).
-8 Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99252 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408 (1982)).
"1 See 15 U.S.C. § 4402(a) (Supp. 1986). The section requires the rotation of the following warnings to be placed on all smokeless tobacco products by the manufacturer, packager
or seller of such product:
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While the Act of 1986 promotes uniform labeling practices by a
preemption provision, 40 it expressly preserves the right of a plaintiff to challenge such a warning-label under traditional state common law. 41 It is asserted that this statute presents persuasive evidence that Congress did not envision common law tort liability as
42
posing obstacles to the legislative purposes of the Act.
HYPOTHETICAL CONFLICTS Do NOT WARRANT PREEMPTION

Since congressional intent to preempt state law must be "clear
and manifest,"4 3 the Supreme Court has ruled that the presence of
potential or "hypothetical" conflict between state and federal law
will not warrant a finding of preemption.4 4 While state tort claims
WARNING: This Product May Cause Mouth Cancer.
WARNING: This Product May Cause Gum Disease And Tooth Loss.
WARNING: This Product Is Not A Safe Alternative to Cigarettes.
15 U.S.C. § 4402 (a) (Supp. 1986).
40 See 15 U.S.C. § 4406 (Supp. II 1986). The preemption clause found in this section is
almost identical to that used in the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. Section
4406 provides:
(a) Federal Action
No statement relating to the use of smokeless tobacco products and health, other
than the statements required by section 4402 of this title, shall be required by any
Federal agency to appear on any package or in any advertisement.., of a smokeless tobacco product.
(b) State and Local Action
No statement relating to the use of smokeless tobacco products and health, other
than the statements required by section 4402 of this title, shall be required by any
state or local statute or regulation to be included on any package or in any advertisement ... of a smokeless tobacco product.
Id. Compare id. with 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982 & Supp. 1986); see supra note 3 for language of
section 1334.
41 See 15 U.S.C. § 4406(c) (Supp. II 1986). The pertinent language states that
"[n]othing in this chapter shall relieve any person from liability at common law or under
state statutory law to any other person." Id.
42 See Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171, 1179 (D. Mass 1986). Judge
Mazzone suggests that Congress was well aware of the Cipollone case and acted consciously
in preserving common law claims in section 4406(c) of the Act of 1986. See id. at 1179-80;
see also 132 CONG. REC. S1124 (1986)(statement of Sen. Kennedy)(Congress does not "intend to preempt product liability suits in state or federal courts based on failure to warn.").
Judge Mazzone concluded that "[i]t
seems certain ... that Congress believes that allowing
products liability suits involving the adequacy of cigarette warnings will not frustrate its
objective of uniform warnings." Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1179.
43 Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981)(quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,
430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
44 See Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982). In Rice, the Court stated
that, "[t]he existence of a hypothetical or potential conflict is insufficient to warrant the
preemption of the state statute." Id. In this case, which arose in the antitrust context, the
Court held the state statute was not preempted by federal laws "simply because the state
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challenging the sufficiency of warnings may have an ancillary regulatory effect,4 5 it is asserted that the Third Circuit erred in classi4
fying such claims as "requirements" in its conflict analysis. Common law liability merely creates "some probability" that
manufacturers will change their warnings, a matter left entirely to
their own discretion.4 7 Moreover, since manufacturers may choose
not to alter their labels without incurring statutory liability, the
mere possibility of a common law claim makes no imposition on
cigarette manufacturers.4 s
scheme might have an anticompetitive effect." Id. (emphasis added); see supra note 23.
5 See Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 156 (1982); Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 324-25 (1981).
4 See Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187. The court relied on Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630
F.2d 950, 962 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981), to establish that common law
liability has the "effect" of imposing requirements on manufacturers. See Cipollone, 789
F.2d at 187. It is asserted that this reliance is misplaced. Not only did the Dawson court
mention a "requiremental effect" purely in dicta, see Dawson, 630 F.2d at 962, but the court
there upheld a state common law claim, refusing to find that it created an obstacle to congressional purposes. See id. Moreover, it is clear that the mere possibility of a "regulatory
effect" does not warrant a finding of preemption. See Rice 458 U.S. at 659; see infra note 48.
Nor does this potential "effect" rise to the "immediate constitutional repugnancy" which
the Supreme Court has traditionally found necessary to preempt state law. See Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 554-55 (1973).
'7 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1156 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd 789
F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3474 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1987)(No. 86-563).
One writer commenting upon the preemption clause of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982 &
Supp. 1986), has concluded that a common law damages claim does not impose a requirement upon cigarette manufacturers. See Garner, supra note 5, at 1453-54. Professor Garner
states:
A damages award, however, requires only payment-it is not an injunction requiring the defendant to incorporate into its advertising a fixed legend different from
the federally required label. The labeling acts do not prohibit a manufacturer
from warning of undisclosed health risks. The only prohibition is against a state
agency passing a law requiring cigarette companies to use a different label.
Id. at 1454; see also Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541 (D.C. Cir.) (verdict
against Chevron "is not equivalent to a direct regulatory command that Chevron change its
label"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
Moreover, there would be nothing inconsistent with the provisions of the Act if a manufacturer were to add an additional warning to that which Congress has required, since section 1334 of the Act only makes it unlawful to omit the required warning. See supra note 2;
Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1167. Many courts have held that the congressional labeling requirements pertaining to warnings are "minimum" requirements only and will not release
manufacturers from liability merely because Congress established a "comprehensive" regulatory scheme. See supra note 16; see also Hubbard-Hall Chem.Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d
402, 405 (1st Cir. 1965)(where Congress had not occupied field of state tort remedies, Dep't.
of Agriculture-approved label did not release state from potential tort liability for failure to
warn.).
49 See Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1160. The only "requirement" imposed upon cigarette
manufacturers faced with common law liability suits would be the payment of damages to
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The Third Circuit's assumption that a state common law action poses an "obstacle" to "protecting the interests of national
economy" is based on speculation and hypothesis.4 9 The Cipollone
court does not support its conclusion with any statistical information pertaining to the economic well-being of the tobacco industry,
nor any other analytical evidence. 50 The court's conclusory approach ignores the reality that common law liability exists side by
side with federal regulation in a number of other industries, without disastrous economic consequences. Il Congress has often recognized the coexistence of common law claims within a uniform regulatory scheme, and thus the imposition of common law liability
does not frustrate congressional efforts towards labeling
52
uniformity.
successful claimants. See id. The success of a claim challenging the adequacy of warning
labels and advertising practices is purely a matter of speculation and as such cannot warrant
preemption. See Rice, 458 U.S. at 659 (1982); see also Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S.
519, 545 (1977)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)(unwarranted speculation does not demonstrate
conflict necessary to displace traditional state law).
The Supreme Court has also recognized the coexistence of state damage claims and a
federal regulatory scheme, stating that, "[w]hatever compensation standard a [sltate imposes, whether it be negligence or strict liability, a licensee remains free to continue operating under federal standards and to pay for the injury that results." Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 264 (1984)(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
19 See Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187. While the Third Circuit held that common law liability stands as an obstacle to Congress' carefully drawn balance of purposes under the Act, see
id., the court did not mention whether a common law claim would obstruct "warning the
public of the hazards of cigarette smoking" or "protecting the interests of national economy." Id. It is suggested that the imposition of common law liability would not frustrate the
interests of the national economy, which has successfully absorbed the imposition of common law liability on every other major industry in the nation.
50 See id. While Judge Hunter notes that a state law may actually conflict with federal
law when "compliance with both. . . is a physical impossibility," id. at 185, (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)), the court does not
determine whether such conflict exists here. See Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 185. The district
court, however, in applying this analysis, found that the payment of damages is wholly consistent with fulfilling the labeling requirements under the Act. See Cipollone, 593 F. Supp.
at 1167.
" See Garner, supra note 5, at 1423. The food, drug automobile and machine tool industries have been exposed to civil liability as well as federal regulation. See id.
2 See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1542 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1062 (1984); Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 658 (1st Cir. 1981);
see also Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171, 1179 (D. Mass. 1986) ("allowing
products liability suits involving the adequacy of cigarette warnings will not frustrate its
objective of uniform warnings").
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INADEQUACIES OF OBSTACLE CONFLICT UNDER

Hines

The Cipollone analysis is representative of the inadequacies of
53

the "obstacle conflict" approach set forth in Hines v. Davidowit.

In Hines, the Supreme Court declared that its "primary function"
was to determine whether, under the circumstances of a particular
case, the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."54
The Court, however, claimed that "there cannot be any rigid
formula.., to determine the meaning and purpose of every act of
Congress." 55 Such a determination of whether a state law stands
as an obstacle to congressional purposes, therefore, inevitably involves a highly discretionary analysis, which allows an antagonistic
court to infer an expedient "conflict" through hypothesis.5 6 It is
suggested that the discretionary nature of the obstacle conflict
analysis warrants its abandonment, as it offers little guidance to
lower courts which need sound legal reasoning rather than arbitrary determinations to confront this confusing area of the law.
53 312 U.S. 52 (1941).

I" Id. at 67-68. Justice Black concluded that the Federal Alien Registration Act of 1940
("Act of 1940"), when considered in connection with other laws regulating immigration and
naturalization, was intended by Congress to be a single, comprehensive and uniform scheme
for the regulation of all aliens, thus rendering invalid a Pennsylvania state law which imposed additional or auxiliary requirements for the registration of aliens. See id. at 74. The
Court in dicta stated that where Congress provides a "complete scheme of regulation," the
states cannot, "inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail
or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations." Id. at 66-67.
5 Id. at 67. The Hines court made use of the legislative history of the Act of 1940 and
the scope of other federal laws regulating alien admissions in concluding that Congress
sought a "uniform national registration system." Id. at 74. In dissent, Justice Stone indicated that the majority did not offer any evidence to show that the state legislation "conflicted" with the federal law. Id. at 77 (Stone, J., dissenting). It is submitted that the Hines
majority did not base its holding on a "conflict" analysis, but rather found that Congress
intended to "occupy the field" of alien registration regulation. See id. at 78. (Stone, J., dissenting). The Cipollone court's analysis is likewise void of any evidence of "conflict" with
federal law in its preemption of state common law claims. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
11 See Rothschild, supra note 3, at 854. In considering whether a statute's purpose is
frustrated, courts may proceed in an abstract fashion, hypothesizing "situations that produce a conflict between the state and federal legislation." Id. This criticism is particularly
valid where a court, finding state law to frustrate a federal purpose, bases its premise on
"unproved factual speculation." See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 543-49
(1977)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The court in Cipollone "accepts appellant's assertion"
that a common law claim will pose an "obstacle" to federal purposes, without resort to the
legislative history of the Act or supporting statistics regarding the effect on the national
economy. See Cipolone, 789 F.2d at 187; supra note 53.
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Legislative enactments are the result of political bargaining and
compromise, thus giving rise to stated congressional purposes
which are often inconsistent. 57 It is submitted that a court employing the highly discretionary Hines analysis might focus disproportionate attention on one congressional objective. This analysis
could lead to a result-oriented approach whereby a court strikes
down a state common law claim as "tipping" the "careful balance
of purposes" of Congress, disregarding the overall policy underlying the legislation.
A less discretionary approach to conflict analysis is found in
FloridaLime & Avocado Growers, Inc., v. Paul.55 In Florida Lime,
the Supreme Court focused on whether compliance with both state
and federal law was a "physical impossibility."59 The Court held
that the test of whether federal law preempts state law "is whether
both regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the field, not whether they are aimed at similar
or different objectives." 60 Such a test will base judicial decisions on
an objective standard, thus freeing the lower courts from the
highly discretionary determination of whether state law frustrates
congressional purposes."1 Finally, it is asserted that the Florida
11

Rarely, it is submitted, will a state law advance all the purposes of a federal regula-

tory scheme since congressional purposes in a given act may be competing and inconsistent
as they are here. See Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171, 1174 (D. Mass. 1986).
A court might classify the competing political interests present in every piece of federal
legislation as a "careful balance," and thereby claim that the state law stands as an "obstacle" to federal purposes. Conversely, it is suggested that a court in favor of the state law
might focus only on those "purposes" of the federal legislation which are furthered by the
state law, and determine that there is no conflict. Applying the Cipollone analysis, it is
therefore submitted that another court, recognizing that common law claims would further
the ultimate remedial purposes of the Act, could have found the state law completely consistent with the federal regulation test as applied by the Third Circuit. It is suggested that the
leeway given courts in determining the "purposes" of a federal statute under the Hines test
will allow judges to mold their reasoning to ultimately conform with their personal views on
preemption. See Rothschild, supra note 3, at 854.
58 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
59 Id. at 142-43.
60 Id. at 142. The Court concluded that where no irreconcilable conflict existed between
the federal and state regulation as to the marketability of avocados, the federal statute imposed only minimum standards of quality which states could strengthen by imposing their
own, more stringent requirements. See id. at 148.
"1 The FloridaLime test allows less subjectivity in the "actual conflict" determination,
thereby precluding those "hypothetical conflicts" often developed by antagonistic courts.
,See Rothschild, supra note 3, at 837. As a result, it is submitted that the Florida Lime test
will also provide lower courts with clear guidelines as to when state law actually conflicts
with federal law. This will eliminate the confusion surrounding the competing and often
inconsistent applications of both Hines and Florida Lime in Supreme Court analysis of
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Lime analysis gives greater deference to the presumption that Con2
gress did not intend to leave injured victims without a remedy.
CONCLUSION

In Cipollone, the Third Circuit has determined that state
common law claims challenging the adequacy of cigarette warning
labels are preempted under section 1334 of the Act. This construction stands not only in opposition to the legislative history of the
Act and its amendments, but significantly impairs Congress' express intention of assuring that the public is adequately warned of
the hazards of cigarette smoking. Moreover, the court's ruling effectively leaves injured plaintiffs without a remedy for violation of
their state-created rights absent clear congressional intent to do so.
Finally, the Cipollone court has contributed to the growing confusion surrounding preemption and conflict analysis, which threatens
further uncertainty in the lower courts. The Third Circuit's refusal
to recognize state common law claims challenging the adequacy of
cigarette warning labels under the Act supports the groundless immunity uniquely enjoyed by the tobacco industry.
Robert C. Carlsen

"conflict preemption." See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 549 (1977)(Rehnquist,

J., dissenting).
02 See Iconco v. Jensen Constr. Co., 622 F.2d 1291, 1296 (8th Cir. 1980). Courts have
presumed that Congress did not intend to preempt state law when such a result would affect

generations of judicial development; state tort law is one example of a judicially-developed
area. See id. It is submitted that this presumption is particularly strengthened when, as
here, the Act is silent as to civil remedies and state common law is plaintiff's sole means of
recovery. The Supreme Court has stated in an analogous situation that the failure of Con-

gress to provide a federal remedy makes it "difficult to believe that Congress would, without
comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct."
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)(Blackmun J., dissenting); see also
United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 663-64 (1954).

The end result of the Third Circuit's holding is to leave plaintiff Cipollone without
recourse to seek compensation for the violation of a state created right. See Cipollone, 593
F. Supp. at 1153.

